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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JAMES FRANCIS DENIER, : Case No. 20081057-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is not incarcerated 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-103 
(2009). Appellant, James Denier, was convicted of violation of a protective order, a class 
A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (2008). The judgment is attached as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the City to present evidence at 
trial in violation of the hearsay rules. 
Standard of Review: "The question of whether evidence is admissible can be 
either a question of discretion, which we review for abuse of discretion, or a 
question oflaw, which we review for correctness.5' State v. Martin, 2002 UT 
34, «|129, 44P.3d 805. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling Denier could not discuss the terms 
of the visitation order between Samuel and himself. 
Standard of Review: "[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 
proffered evidence is relevant, and the |appellate court] will find error in a relevancy 
ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion." State vs. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
III. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the City presented 
sufficient evidence to establish a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108. 
Standard of Review: The Court "rcviewfs] the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." 
State v. Pctree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citing numerous cases). The verdict of 
the jury will be reversed for insufficient evidence when the "evidence . . . is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id. 
However, notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision, this Court has 
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Specifically: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it 
will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^ 15, 63 P.3d 94 (citing Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
The first issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 105:3738,69,70. The 
second issue was preserved in the record at 105:102,103. The third issue was preserved 
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in the record at 105:86. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issues here: Utah R. Evid. 801, 802, 
and 803; Utah R. Evid. 16; Utah Code Ann. §76-5-108; and Utah R. of Crim. 17(p). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On January 17, 2008, Salt Lake City charged James Denier ("Denier") with one 
count of violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor under Utah State Code § 
76-5-108. (R. 1.) 
On October 1, 2008, the jury trial began. (R. 105:2.) Salt Lake City called two 
witnesses, Catherine Samuel ("Samuel") and Officer Degraw ("Degraw"). (R. 105:48, 
67.) Denier testified on his own behalf. (R. 105:95.) The jury trial lasted one day. (R. 
105:138-140.) The jury began deliberations and reached a verdict that same day. (R. 
105:137-140.) The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R. 105:138.) 
On November 25, 2008, the trial court sentenced Denier to 365 days in jail. (R. 
90.) The trial court suspended all but four days jail. (R. 90.) On December 23, 2008 
Denier filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R. 103.) Denier is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Salt Lake City Presented the Following Evidence at Trial According to the City's 
evidence, Catherine Samuel had known Denier for more than fourteen years. (R. 
105:53.) Samuel had a protective order against Denier. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, 
Protective Order, cittached as Addendum 13; (R. 105:55.) The protective order had been 
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in place for ten years and prohibited Denier from contacting Samuel except regarding 
visitation of their son, Connor. (R. 105:55,56.) 
On December 30, 2007, at approximately five o' clock, Samuel called Denier. (R. 
105:49.) She had been out of town with their son and Denier called several of her 
acquaintances asking if they knew where Connor was. (R. 105:49.) Samuel called 
Denier and told him to please not call any of her Iriends. (R. 105:49.) The conversation 
lasted a few minutes. (R. 105:51.) 
According to Samuel, during the conversation. Denier swore and yelled. (R. 
105:50.) After the first conversation, Samuel called Denier again to advise him that it 
was not o.k. for Denier to swear and yell over the phone. (R. 105:51.) Further, if he 
swore or yelled, Samuel would consider that harassment. (R. 105:51.) 
Shortly alter the second conversation, approximately five twenty, Denier called 
Samuel. (R. 105:51.) She did not answer the phone. (R. 105:51.) Denier left a message 
on her voicemail. (R. 105:51.) She did not answer the phone because she thought Denier 
was angry and he would leave a message. (R. 105:52.) Samuel recalled that on the 
message Denier stated he knew the phone call was being recorded. (R. 105:53.) 
Specifically, Samuel recalled that Denier said: 
Go ahead and take me to court, like you have three or four times in the past eight 
or nine years. Go ahead and make a spectacle of yourself because I've always 
been found innocent. You don't have a protective order, you never have. It 
doesn't hold any weight in court because I've always been found innocent. (R. 
105:54.) 
One line that stood out to Samuel was that Denier stated the protective order 
"doesn't hold a teardrop worth of water." (R. 105:54.) Samuel testified the message left 
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by Denier did not relate to visitation of their son and therefore violated the protective 
order. (R. 105:56.) 
On cross examination, Samuel said she had been in Colorado prior to December 
30, 2008 with their son, Connor. (R. 105: 57.) Further, she documents everything and 
although she did not have the recorded message she had a ''written recollection" of the 
incident and the police report. (R. 105:59.) 
During the trial, the defense attempted to introduce evidence that Samuel had been 
held in contempt of court to impeach her testimony. (R. 105:61.) The trial court ruled 
that the evidence was irrelevant to the current trial. (R. 105:63.) 
After Samuel, the City called Officer Degraw to testify. (R. 105:67.) Officer 
Degraw responded to the incident. (R. 105:68.) Prior to this incident, Degraw had never 
met Denier nor heard his voice. (R. 105:75.) 
Samuel told Degraw that Denier contacted her by phone and also attempted to find 
her through friends. (R. 105:68.) Further, she saved a message that Denier left on her 
voicemail. (R. 105:69.) Degraw listened to the message. (R. 105:69.) The caller never 
identified himself. (R. 105:75.) 
Defense counsel objected to Degraw's testimony relating the content of the 
message for lack of foundation and hearsay. (R. 105:69, 70.) The trial court held that 
Degraw could testily about the content of the message but not who left the message. (R. 
105:69.) Degraw testified the caller said: 
Me knew the conversation was being recorded. 1 Ic [the caller) was talking about 
the complaints that had been filed over the last eight or nine years, and that they'd 
all been found false or, his words were that they were found innocent, not guilty. 
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He [the caller] was talking, he did talk about "this is about our son, not about you, 
not about me.' 
At that time, Dcgraw thought the incident did not violate the protective order 
because they called back and forth and the protective order allowed contact to arrange 
visitation with their child. (R. 105:76.) Dcgraw never spoke to Denier regarding the 
message. (R. 105:77.) 
Denier Testified in His Defense. 
Denier could sec his son every Wednesday and every other weekend. (R. 105: 
96.) During the holidays there was not a precise custody arrangement. (R. 105:96). 
However, he regularly saw his son. (R. 105:97.) When he didn't have custody, Denier 
would talk to his son several times a month. (R. 105:97.) His son had a cell phone that 
Denier would call. (R. 105:97.) 
Prior to December 30th, Denier called his son several times but there was no 
answer. (R. 105:97.) Denier called his son's cell phone and home phone. (R. 105:98.) 
He tried to contact his son approximately six or seven times. (R. 105:98.) After trying to 
contact his son several times, Denier became anxious and concerned. (R. 105: 98.) He 
called his son's friend and spoke to the friend's father. (R. 105:98.) Denier learned his 
son and Samuel were in Colorado for Christmas. (R. 105: 99.) Once he learned his son 
had been in Colorado, he was relieved that his son was o.k. (R. 105:99.) 
The next contact Denier had was when Samuel called him. (R. 105:100.) Denier 
recalled that Samuel called on December 30th and was upset that Denier called Connor's 
friend and spoke with the friend's father. (R. 105: 99.) Denier could not remember if he 
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called Samuel on the day in question. (R. 105:101.) However. Denier had left messages 
before on Samuel's voicemail. (R. 105:102.) Denier was never questioned by law 
enforcement about the incident. (R. 105:101.) 
During the trial, defense counsel asked Denier if Samuel ever called him and 
asked Denier to dinner. (R. 105:102.) The City objected and the trial court sustained the 
objected arguing the information was not relevant. (R. 105:102.) Defense counsel also 
asked Denier about the visitation order between Samuel and Denier. (R. 105:102.) The 
City objected and again argued the information was not relevant. (R. 105:102.) The 
defense argued the information was relevant in that it went to the credibility of the City's 
witness, Samuel. (R. 105:103.) Also, the protective order allowed for contact if it related 
to their son. (R. 105:103.) If Samuel took their son to Colorado in violation of the 
parties visitation agreement, it would make it more likely any contact by Denier was 
related to the visitation of their son and therefore was not a violation of the protective 
order. (R. 105:103.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury deliberated for approximately two hours and 
later that night returned a verdict of guilty. (R. 105:138.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it allowed Officer Degraw to testify about a message 
left on Catherine Samuel's recorded message. The trial court permitted Degraw to testify 
as to the content of the voicemail. 1 lowever. the trial court ruled Degraw could not 
testify as to who left the recorded message. The caller never identified himself and 
Degraw had not previously spoken to Denier. 
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Allowing Degraw to testify about the reeorded message violated the hearsay rules. 
The reeorded message was an out of court statement being offered for the truth of the 
matters assert. Therefore, it was not admissible in court. A statement is not hearsay if 
the statement is offered against a party and is against the party's own statement. £vee 
Utah R. Uvid. 801. However, Degraw could not identify who left the message. He could 
not establish that the recorded message was left by Denier and it was against his interest. 
The visitation order between Samuel and Denier regarding their son, Connor, was 
relevant in that Denier was permitted to contact Samuel if that contact related to the 
visitation of their son. If Samuel had taken Connor out of the state of Utah in violation of 
that order it would make it more probable that any contact with Samuel related to their 
son. 
The trial court erred by denying Dcnicr's motion to dismiss the case after the City 
presented its case. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Denier violated the 
protective order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING OFFICER DEGRAWS 
TESTIMONY RELATING TO A RECORDED MESSAGE. 
A. The testimony of Officer Degraw and Proceedings. 
In this case, the City called Officer Degraw ("Degraw'') to testify. (R. 105:67.) 
Degraw was the responding officer and listened to a recorded message Samuel, the 
complaining witness, had saved on her voicemail. (R. 105:69.) While listening to the 
8 
message, Degraw recorded it onto a small recorder he carried with him. He then 
transcribed the message and included the transcription in his police report. 
Prior to this incident, Degraw had never spoken to Denier and the caller never 
identified himself. (R. 105:75.) However, Samuel told Degraw the message was from 
Denier and was left earlier that day in violation a protective order. (R. 105:68.) 
The defense made a Motion in Limine to exclude Degraw's testimony with regard 
to the content of the recorded message left on Samuel's voicemail. (R. 105:37,38.) The 
City did not introduce the actual message. 
The defense first argued Degraw's testimony would be double hearsay. (R. 
105:38.) The Officer never heard Denier make the statements. Rather, the statements 
were left on a voicemail. (R. 105:51.) That in turn, was double hearsay, and should be 
excluded. (R. 105:38.) Second, the defense argued that because the Officer lacked 
firsthand knowledge as to the identity of the caller, and could only identify the caller 
through information given to him by Samuel, the message was hearsay. (R. 105:38.) 
The trial court ruled that Samuel and Degraw could testify about the content of the 
recorded message. (R. 105:39,40.) However, if Degraw was unable to identify the caller 
from firsthand knowledge, then that would be a foundational issue and the matter would 
be revisited during Degraw's testimony. (R. 105:40.) The Officer could testily as to what 
he heard on the message but not who left the message. (R. 105:42.) 
During the trial, the City called Officer Degraw to the stand. (R. 105:67.) The 
City asked if he listened to a recorded message left on Samuel's voicemail. (R. 
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105:68,69.) Again, the defense objected for lack of foundation. (R. 105:69.) The trial 
court overruled the objection and the Officer was allowed to testify. (R. 105:69.) 
Degraw testified the male voice stated he knew the message was being recorded 
and referenced other complaints that were made in the past. (R. 105:70.) However, 
Degraw could not remember the specifics without referring to his report. (R. 105:70.) 
While Degraw was refreshing his recollection, the defense objected, again, arguing 
Degraw's testimony would be hearsay. (R. 105:70.) The trial court noted the objection 
but overruled it. (R. 105:70.) Degraw went on to testify that the caller stated he knew 
the conversation was being recorded and there had been many complaints filed in the last 
eight or nine years. (R. 105:70.) All the complaints had been found false. (R. 105:70). 
Particularly, Degraw noted the caller said "this is about our son, not about you, not about 
me." (R. 105:70.) 
B. Degraw's testimony regarding the recorded message is hearsay 
and should have been excluded. 
Rule 801 defines hearsay as an oral or written assertion or statement, "other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). A statement is being 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted when it is being offered to prove whether the 
statement is in fact true and not merely to show that it was made. See State v. Sorcnscn, 
617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake City vs. Alircs, 2000 UT App 244. «,| 22. 9 P.3d 769. 
An out of court statement is not considered hearsay, if the statement is offered against a 
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part) and is the party's own statement, an admission by part)-opponent. Utah R. livid. 
802. 
Hearsay is not admissible unless there is an exception or the Utah Rules of 
Evidence allow it. Utah R. livid. 802. ''Hearsay statements have been generally 
discredited because they . . . lack trustworthiness." State in the Interest of K.D.S., 578 
P.2d9, 12 (Utah 1978). 
7. The Statements were not an admissions by a party-opponent. 
Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that hearsay is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing. 
Utah R. livid. 801. The rule further defines statements that are not hearsay. Utah R. 
Evid. 801 (d)(2). A statement that is being offered against a party and is the part) \s own 
statement or was adopted by that party is not hearsay. Id. 
In this case, Officer Degraw could not identify the caller and therefore could not 
establish that the recorded message was made by Denier. (R. 105:75.) In turn, the 
recorded message was hearsay and should have been excluded. 
On December 30, 2007. the complaining witness, Samuel, called the police and 
alleged that Denier had violated a protective order. (R. 105:68.) Samuel recently 
returned from a trip and made several phone calls to Denier. (R. 105:51.52.) Samuel was 
upset because Denier had called several of their son's friends looking for their son. (R. 
105:100.) After the calls. Samuel testified that Denier called. (R. 105:51.) Samuel 
didn't answer the phone and he left a message on her voicemail. (R. 105:51.) Samuel 
asserted that this message violated the protective order. (R. 105:68.) 
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Officer Degraw responded to Samuel's house. (R. 105:68.) His listened to the 
message, recorded it with a handheld recorder, and then transcribed it into his police 
report. He then testified, at trial, to the contents of the recorded message. (R. 105:70.) 
During trial the court allowed Degraw*s testimony regarding what was said on the 
recorded message but would not allow Degraw identify who left the message because 
Degraw had neither spoken with Denier nor met him prior to this incident. (R. 105:41.) 
Without Degraw being able to identify the caller, the statement could not be 
accredited to Denier. Degraw could not identify who made the call. When Degraw 
testified as to what was on the recorded message and specifically what the caller had said 
this statement was hearsay. It was an out of court statement that was being offered into 
evidence. Had Degraw been able to identify who the caller was either from prior 
experience with Denier or the caller identified himself, then the statement would fall 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) and would not be hearsay. 
However, because the recorded message was hearsay, the trial court erred in allowing 
Degraw to testify about the contents of the message. Certainly. Degraw could have 
testified that he responded to a report of a violation of a protective order and the 
complaining witness had a recorded message and that he listened to the message. He 
should not have testified about the content of the message. His testimony should have 
been excluded pursuant to Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
2. Degraw's testimony regarding the recorded message was being 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
Denier was charged with violation of a protective. The protective order limited 
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contact between the complaining witness, Samuel, and the defendant, Denier. (R. 
105:55,56.) Denier could only contact Samuel to effectuate visitation between him and 
his son. (R. 105:55,56.) When statements are made not to prove the truth of the 
statement but to prove the statement was made, it is not being offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. Mires, 2000 UT App 244 ]\ 22. 
In Alires, the defendant was convicted of telephone harassment. Id. at T] 1. The 
defendant called the complaining witness on the phone and threatened to kill her. Id. at ^ 
3. While an officer was at the complaining witness* home, the phone rang. \d. at_/|] 4. 
The caller again threatened to kill the witness. Id. During trial the complaining witness 
did not testify. However, the Officer took the stand and testified as to the statements she 
heard. Id. at ^[5. The defense objected to the testimony. Id. at *|j 9. The trial court 
allowed the testimony. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the testimony was not hearsay 
because the statements were not being offered to prove that the defendant would actually 
kill the complaining witness. Id, at *j[ 29. Rather, they were being offered to prove that 
the statements were made. Id. 
The City's evidence in favor of a protective order violation was that Denier called 
and left a message on Samuel's voicemail and this violated the protective order. Denier 
could not recall if he left a message, however, he did recall that around the date of the 
violation he had tried to contact his son directly. (R. 105:98.) However, his son was not 
answering his phone. (R. 105:98.) In an effort to locate his son he contacted the father of 
his son's friend. (R. 105:98.) It was during this phone conversation that Denier learned 
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that Samuel and his son where in Colorado for Christmas. (R. 105:99.) During trial, the 
City noted the statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (R. 
105:40.) 
This case differs from the A1 ires case because the protective order allowed for 
some contact. In the A1 ires case, the City had to prove the statements were made. The 
threatening statement served as the basis for the charged offense. In this case, Denier 
was subject to a protective order. The protective order permitted Denier to contact 
Samuel under certain circumstances. The contact itself did not serve as the basis for the 
charged offense. A statement alone would not be a violation. Rather, it must be 
determined that the contact was not related to visitation of their child. Connor. 
Therefore, the content of the recorded message was being offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted and is therefore hearsay. 
II. THE VISITATION ORDER WAS RELEVANT. 
Utah Rule of] Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution 
of the state of Utah or the Utah Rules of Evidence. Any evidence that is not relevant is 
not admissible. Utah R. Rvid. 402. Relevant evidence means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. 
livid. 401. 'The standard for determining the relevance of evidence is exceedingly low." 
State ex rel. G.C, 2008 U f App 270.1] 11, 191 P.3d 55. "|E"|vcn if [relevant] evidence 
has the potential for prejudicing a defendant in a criminal case, it will be admitted if it has 
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unusual probative value." State vs. Downs. 2008 UT App 247, U 7, 190 P.3d 17 
(citations omitted). 
In Downs, the defendant denied any knowledge of possession of a controlled 
substance found in her pocket. The state sought to introduce testimony that her residence 
had been searched and drugs were found there on a previous occasion. This Court held 
the evidence helped to establish that the defendant had ready access to. was 
knowledgeable about, and had the requisite intent to posses the controlled substance and 
allowed the evidence. 
In this case, the protective order prohibited any contact unless it related to their 
son. Like Downs, Samuel testified that the contact between the two was not related to 
visitation of their son. However, on direct examination, Denier testified that there was a 
visitation order in place. When asked about the content of the visitation order and 
whether Denier was entitled to see him during the holidays, the City objected. (R. 
105:102.) The trial court sustained the objection holding the visitation order was not 
relevant to the case. (R. 105:102.) The defense argued it was relevant if Denier should 
have had custody during the time Samuel to their son to Colorado. (R. 105:102.) If he 
should have had custody, it would make it more probable that any contact between the 
parties was related to visitation. The court erred by sustaining the City's objection and 
preventing Denier from testifying about the content of the visitation order. 
ni
- TAKEN ALONE OR TOGETHER THE ERRORS DETAILED 
ABOVE PREJUDICED DENIER. 
Determining the harm caused by the errors detailed above requires that they be 
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considered in the context of the evidence and arguments al trial. State vs. Larscn, 2005 
UT App 201. *| 6, 113 P.3d 998. Harm sufficient to require reversal occurs unless 'it is 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of proceedings." State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, f|| 28, 
153 P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, If 10 n.l, 994 P.2d 1237) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The errors here undermine confidence that the defendant 
received a fair trial. 
The error in allowing Dcgraw to testify about the contents of the voiccmail was 
prejudicial. The City prosecuted Denier for Violation of Protective Order Class A 
Misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. 76-5-108. For the offense, the City was required to prove 
that the Denier was the subject to a protective order, he intentionally or knowingly 
violated that order after having been properly served. This case is unique in that contact 
would not have been sufficient to establish a violation. Rather, the protective order 
permitted certain contact. Denier could contact Samuel if it was related to the visitation 
of their son, Connor. 
In this case, the City presented evidence that Samuel spent Christmas with their 
son Connor, in Colorado. Denier had called several of Connor's friends in an attempt to 
locate his son. (R. 105:49.) Upon returning home, Samuel called Denier upset because 
Denier was trying to contact their son. (R. 105:100.) The City was unable to introduce 
the original recording but Samuel summarized what the message said. (R. 105:54.) 
The only evidence of the violation was officer Dcgraw \s testimony. Dcgraw's 
testimony was crucial to the City's case. The prosecutor relied on his testimony to urge 
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jurors to convict. The jury was instructed that they arc the sole judges of the weight of 
the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the facts. (R. 105:113-115.) Further, 
there is no firm rule for determining the truthfulness and credibility of the witnesses and 
that the jury was to use their own judgment. (R. 105:115.) The jury was also instructed 
that they could judge the witnesses. (R. 105:114.) They could consider the witnesses* 
motive for testifying and the interest the witness may have in the outcome of the case and 
how such an interest may have affected or colored their testimony. (R. 105:114.) 
The only witness the City presented to the jury that could have been construed as 
neutral would have been Dcgraw's testimony. He had not met the parties before this 
incident and was the first one to respond to the scene. His testimony would have been 
crucial to the jury's determination. Dcgraw's testimony significantly contributed to the 
Denier's conviction. 
Because the trial court allowed Dcgraw to testify about the contents of the 
recorded message, Denier is entitled to a new trial where the City must be precluded from 
presenting the inadmissible hearsay. 
Second, precluding Denier from discussing the visitation order was prejudicial. At 
issue in the case, and for the City to prove a violation, was dependant on whether the 
contact related to the visitation of the parties' son. The protective order prohibited 
contact except to effectuate visitation of their son. Denier testified that he was trying to 
contact his son during the holiday. Had evidence been introduced that Denier had legal 
custody of Connor during the time in question it is more probable that the jury would 
have considered his contact with Samuel lawful. 
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Combined with Dcgraw's testimony regarding the content of the message and the 
preclusion of the defense discussion of visitation order. Denier was prejudiced and is 
entitled to a new trial. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DENIER'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AFTER THE STATE PRESENTED ITS 
CASE. 
The evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction for a violation of a 
protective order. Utah Rule or Criminal Procedure 17(p) provides that at the conclusion 
of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the c\ idence. the court may 
issue an order dismissing any information or indictment upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged. Utah R. of Crim. P. 
17(p). To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd. 2001 UT 30, |^ 
13. 25 P.3d 985 (citations omitted). 
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long as a 
reasonable interpretation, that evidence supports each clement of the offense, this Court 
will not disturb the jury's verdict. Sec Boyd. 
fW|c do not sit as a second trier of fact: "It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses/ So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops/* 
Id. at «| 16 (citations omitted). See also State v. Cravens, 2000 UT Ct. App 344, 15 P.3d 
635; State v. Chancy, 1999 UT App 309. 989 P.2d 1091. 
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In addition, a conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence. "Circumstantial 
evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as 
to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to 
sustain a conviction." State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998) (citation 
omitted). "|T]hc inferences that can be drawn from th|e] evidence [must] have a basis in 
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337. 344 (Utah 1997) 
(citation omitted). 
Nevertheless, "w[a| guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id. (citation 
omitted). The function of a reviewing court is to ensure "that there is sufficient 
competent evidence as to each clement of a charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Mcrila, 966 P.2d 
270, 272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). As set forth below, the inconclusive 
evidence here gave rise only to speculative possibilities, warranting dismissal of the 
charge. 
The marshaled evidence is as follows: Denier was the subject of a protective 
order. The protective order had been in place for ten years and prohibited Denier from 
contacting Samuel except regarding visitation of their son. Connor. (R. 105:55.56.) At the 
close of the City's case, the defense moved the trial court to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence. (R. 105:86.) 
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On December 30, 2007, Samuel returned home from a trip to Colorado. (R. 105:49.) 
While she was out of town with Connor, Denier called several acquaintances and asked if 
they knew where their son, Connor, was. (R. 105:49.) Denier was entitled to see his son 
every Wednesday and every other weekend. Denier was unable to contact his son during 
the holidays and became concerned. (R. 105:99.) 
Samuel testified that while on the trip she received a phone call from the father of one 
of Connor's friends. (R. 105:49.) She told her that Denier called looking for Connor. 
(R. 105:49.) This upset Samuel. (R. 105:100.) When she returned home, she called 
Denier advising him not to call any of their friends looking for Connor. (R. 105:100.) 
After the call ended, Samuel called Denier again. (R. 105:100.) After the second calf 
Denier called Samuel and left a message. (R. 105:51.) He discussed the protective order 
and stated that this conversation was about their son Connor. (R. 105:54.) Further, he 
stated they have been to court numerous times about the protective and he has never 
convicted. (R. 105:54.) 
The evidence in this case compels the determination that the conversation between 
Samuel and Denier related to their son and Denier's visitation rights and therefore was 
not a violation of the protective order. Samuel was upset because Denier had been trying 
to locate his son. When she returned home, she called him two times advising him not to 
call acquaintances looking for his son. When Denier returned her call he specifically 
noted that this was not about Samuel nor him but was in fact about their son, which 
would not be a violation of the protective order. 
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CONCLUSION 
Denier respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand this 
case for a new trial. 
RliSPKCTRJLLY SUBMITTED this 7S\ day of July, 2009. 
c 
CHARITY SH-REV1 l&ti 
Attorney for Dcfendant/Appel 
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vs. : Case No: 081900493 MO 
JAMES FRANCIS DENIER, : Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Defendant. : Date: November 25, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: VEERU-COLLINGS, PADMA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(B): LORENZO, ELIZABETH A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 12, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 2:56 
CHARGES 
1. VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/01/2008 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 361 day(s). 
Case No: 081900493 
Date: Nov 25, 2008 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 40 hour(s) of community service, 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 2 year(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by S.L. County Criminal Justice. 
Defendant to serve 4 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by December 1/ 2 008. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
SERVE 4 DAYS JAIL - REPORT 12/1/08 
WORK 4 0 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE 
NO CONTACT WITH VICTIM MS SAMUEL 
TabB 
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 FllED DISTRICT CO0RT 
Third Judicial District 
Address (ma^be omitted for privacy) n rp 03 tOOR ddress ( a^ oe o itted 
Cit^ &ate, ZIP SALT 
By 
Telephone (may be omftterf)- Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
K.jCfhrhft ^' $frud4 . 
Petitioner, 
J>W P. Deri?, 
Respondent. 
PROTECTTVE ORDER 
Judge (jjtttf*^ 7 V " ^ 
0*Hr-x. j E ^ ^ J T (^0~<zJL**r 
This matter came for hearing on / £ / z ? / 3 p / , before the undersigned. The 
following parties were in attendance: ' 
Petitioner ^ Petitioner's attorney hr*nk D>My(4r S^/AS\>4WL/^ 
# Respondent a Respondent's attorney 
The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
A having received argument and evidence, 
having accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
v^ y each section that is included in this Order.) 
A 1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
2 . The Respond., is r e i n e d from a^mpting « * . ^ S 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor cnu 
of Petitioner's family or household: 
^ 5 T 3 The Respondent is prohibited from directlyor . i ^ ™ 9 f * £ & % -
• ^ telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Penttoner, vc<rt A * K « * « * 
r ^ R e i n d l " ^ be removed and eluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at. 
J ? £ ^ A & t o l from t e S d n l ^ r f e r i n g with the uoUry services ,o 
^ K > c residence. 
' " V 5 The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school place of " J j * * ^ 
-£- L / o r oAer p .a£ . and their premises, frequented < » £ ^ * X S £ * *e 
the designated household and family members. These places are mennnea y 
following addresses: , I /yf.1] 
using, or possessing a^firarm and/or the following weapon(s): 
7 . m e Petitioner is awarded possession of the foUowing residence, automobile 
and/or other essential personal effects: 
This award is subject to orders concerning the Usted property in future domestic 
proceedings. 
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8. An officer fsom the following law enforcement agency: 
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner 
safely regains possession of the awarded property. 
9. An officer Ifcom the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's 
removal of Respondeht's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The 
law enforcement officer$hall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent 
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items. 
10. The Respondeat is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this 
Order, ihe Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on 
Respondent and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in 
the residence of Respondentv Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of 
Corrections the costs of the\lectronic monitoring required by this Order. The 
Department of Corrections shan\have access to Petitioner's residence to install the 
appropriate monitoring equipment. 
RESPONDEiNT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" THROUGH "10* MAY BE A 
CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through T ) which will 
(expire/be revieWd by the court) days from the date of this order: 
a. The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children: 
Visitation shall be as follows: 
V 
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c. Tne Respondent
 i s restrained from using drugs ana/or alcohol prior to or during 
visitation. 
d. The Responded is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from the 
state of Utah. 
e. 
of $ 
The Respondent ^ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount The Respondent is^or ^ J ^ ^
 U [ a h U n i f o r m C h i l d Support Guidelines. 
f The Respondent is \dered to participate in mandatory income withholding 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
g . The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care 
expenses. \ 
h The Respondent is o r d e r e A pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical 
expenses including premiums, deductions and co-payments. 
i. The Respondent is ordered to paVPetitioner spousal support in the amount of 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a 
result of the abuse in the amount of S \ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the Vinor child/ren's medical expenses, 
suffered as a result of the abuse in the amount of * 
I. Other 
Violation 
ion of provisions V t h r o n g -1- may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation 
Into the allegation of child abuse. 
yC 12. Other: '"~^Xi/o CCA^J^ c&r^^Ujl <d&J swd&o P^jJAyY^AA 
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13. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have 
authority to compel Respondents compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected arras. 
14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing 
that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in ail the United States, the District 
of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
15. Three yean after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: i 4 d i l ? 
: _y 
BY THE CO 
DISTRICT CO 
Recommended by: 
District Court Commissioner Date 
By this signarureJRespondent approves the form, and accepts service, 
of this ProjectiveOrder and waives the right to be personally served. 
R ^ p ^ e r f t * ^ ' * ^ 
Serve Respondent at: 
3&°l 5- /OOP £ &3-
2?2i,H„lH'S IS A TRUE COPv OF 
S T A T E WM 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
5 8/16/96 
